A simulation study of inferential analysis under data overload was conducted with professional intelligence analysts. Using a process tracing methodology, patterns in information sampling and sources of inaccurate statements were identified when analysts were asked to analyze something outside their base of expertise, were tasked with a tight deadline, and had a large data set. The main contribution from this study is a better understanding of potential vulnerabilities in inferential analysis in challenging situations. These vulnerabilities are informative because they point to a set of design criteria that human-centered solutions to data overload should meet in order to be useful. These evaluation criteria are interesting, in part, because they are so difficult to address. They are not amenable to simple, straightforward adjustments or feature additions to current tools. Meeting these design criteria will require innovative design concepts.
INFERENTIAL ANALYSIS UNDER DATA OVERLOAD
This research is driven by a formidable problem in many work domains: analysts tasked to generate a coherent description of a situation based on an avalanche of electronic data. Data overload is a fundamental, ubiquitous problem. Exacerbating this problem in many organizations are two widespread trends. The first is an organizational trend of reducing operational staffing and expertise during nominal situations. As a result, analysts are increasingly required to analyze situations that are outside their immediate base of expertise on a short deadline. The second trend is an increase in the amount of available electronic data. Ironically, this explosion in data availability, although good in principle, complicates the task of effectively sampling the information and adds new cognitive burdens in the analysis process (Woods, Patterson, and Roth, 1998) .
Intelligence analysis in the modern electronic environment can be characterized as an abductive inference task (Josephson and Josephson, 1994) , which involves constructing an explanatory story based on information that is retrieved through keyword search. Events occurring in the world are represented as mainly textual descriptions in reports. Reports on the same events do not necessarily corroborate each other; rather the information is often discrepant along various dimensions (Schum, 1994) .
The thesis question that guided the study design and data analysis was: What are potential vulnerabilities in computersupported inferential analysis under data overload for professional analysts working on a short deadline outside their immediate base of expertise? To meet this target situation, the study was designed so that there was too much data to read in the amount of time given to perform an analysis task that was face valid to the professional analysts who served as the study participants but outside their immediate bases of expertise -analyzing why the maiden flight of the Ariane 501 rocket exploded and what the impacts might be.
Portions of an existing software package designed for intelligence analysis were selected to provide a "baseline" electronic environment that supported the ability to keyword search, browse by date and title, and cut and paste information from selected documents to a text editor.
SIMULATION STUDY
Ten professional analysts representing different areas of expertise at the National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC) were asked to perform an analysis of a simulated Quick Reaction Task (QRT) -the Ariane 501 rocket launch failure that occurred on June 4, 1996. They were asked to provide a verbal briefing on when it was, why it occurred, and what the short-and long-term impacts were. The study participants were provided with a database of approximately 2000 reports, which could be sampled by keyword searching and browsing by date and title. No single report, including the official Inquiry Board Report produced by the European Space Agency (ESA), had all of the information necessary to answer the question. The majority of the database was "on topic" in that the reports contained information that was relevant to the simulated task, but only nine documents in the database were identified as "high-profit" documents in that they were detailed, accurate descriptions of the event from a reputable source.
The process was directly observed, as well as audio and videotaped. It was noted during the sessions what queries were used, how many documents were retrieved by each query, and what articles were opened. The electronic and handwritten notes generated by the participants were collected. The participants were asked to provide a briefing before beginning the task to gauge their background knowledge, to think aloud during the process, and to provide a verbal briefing when they felt that they were finished.
A process tracing methodology (Woods, 1993 ) was used to construct protocols for each study participant. These protocols incorporated the queries that were used, information in the articles that were read, what was verbalized while they read each document, and their physical behavior (e.g., cutting and pasting information from documents).
ARIANE 501 LAUNCH FAILURE
The Ariane 501 incident was a significant event for several reasons. First, the explosion was due to a design problem in the software rather than the classic mechanical failure -there was numerical overflow in an unprotected horizontal velocity variable in the embedded software that was re-used from the Ariane 4, which is a slower rocket. The launch failure was very expensive, with the complete loss of the several hundred million dollar rocket launcher and uninsured Cluster satellite payload and substantial delays to the Ariane 5 rocket and Cluster scientific programs. Additionally, it was the first launch of the new rocket design, which raised concern about the viability of the new design. Overall, however, launch failures are relatively common in the industry and first launches in particular are prone to failure, so the reputation of the Ariane program was not greatly damaged.
Some of the information available to the participants on the Ariane 501 incident was inaccurate due to the naturally occurring sources of inaccuracies in event-driven reporting. All reports immediately following the launch failure had some incorrect or misleading information (e.g., it was reported that ground controllers blew up the rocket when it had actually self-destructed). Other reports had inaccuracies due to translation from a foreign language, secondhand reporting, or a lack of technical expertise (e.g., the cause of the numeric overflow). Additionally, updates would overturn previous assessments (e.g., the original predictions on the delay to the next launch in the rocket series were a couple of months while later predictions gave much longer estimates and the actual delay was about a year).
STUDY FINDINGS
The inferential process employed by all the study participants 1 can be abstractly described as following three interrelated stages: information selection, corroborating information and resolving conflicts, and story construction. Information was sampled from the database through the refinement of keyword queries and by browsing the returned reports by dates and titles. Some of the sampled reports were used as the main basis for the analysis, which we refer to as "key" documents. The key documents were used to generate the skeleton of the analysis product. Supporting documents were then used to corroborate the important information and fill in details. Conflicts in the data were flagged and judgments about which perspective to include were revisited as new information on the topic was identified. When the study participants felt ready, they organized their notes and 1 Two study participants' data were not used in the analysis.
One analyzed a different satellite failure. Another did not complete the task because the printer was not working during his session.
provided a verbal briefing that responded to the initial question. The findings of this study highlight vulnerabilities when inferential analysts are asked to analyze something outside their base of expertise, are tasked with tight deadlines, and have a large data set that can only be sampled and viewed sequentially through the computer "keyhole" (Woods and Watts, 1997) . Patterns were observed across all participants in information sampling and sources of inaccurate statements in the verbal briefings.
Patterns in information sampling
In inferential analysis under data overload in baseline electronic environments with textual databases, information is sampled, often through querying and browsing. The sampling process of participant 5 is summarized in Figure 1 . The participant started the process by using the Boolean keyword query "esa or (european and space and agency)". This query returned 725 hits, so he narrowed the search to documents published after June 1, 1996 after discovering that the date of the incident was June 4, 1996 from scanning three articles. 419 documents remained after this narrowing criteria, which became his "home query" in that he did no more queries. Twenty-eight documents were opened during the analysis (not including two duplicates), 24 of which were on-topic, or relevant to the analysis. Six of the documents that he opened were "high-profit" in that they were judged by the investigators to be highly informative documents. The other three high-profit documents were available in the database but were not returned by either query. The participant cut and pasted portions of eight documents along with references into a word processing file and used a marking function in the software to highlight two documents, one because he stated that it was a remarkably good article and one in case he needed to refer back to it later. Three articles were identified as his "key" documents -1) document 1223 because he remarked that it was "remarkably good" and spent a long time reading it, 2) document 1301 because he spent a long time reading it and made many verbalizations about details of the incident while reading it and said after reading it that now he had a good idea of what had happened, and 3) document 1882 because he said that it was "a definite keeper," that it was like briefings by professional analysts in its quality, spent a long time reading it, cut and pasted the most text from it, and made many verbalizations while reading it. All three of his key documents were high profit documents.
As shown in Figure 2 , all of the study participants used this same basic strategy of narrowing in on a small subset of the available documents which then served as a "home base". All of the participants narrowed their queries to a number that they judged to be manageable (22 -419 documents) from which they opened a set of documents based on a view of the dates and titles (4 -29 documents). They then relied heavily on a subset of these documents (1-4 documents) for their verbal briefings. Although this strategy addressed the data overload problem by scaling down the available data to a manageable amount, it left the participants vulnerable to missing critical information, such as the high profit documents.
During this process, some study participants verbalized that perhaps they should conduct new searches for specific information, but did not. In addition, comments made by some of the study participants indicated that they did not know what was available in the database and how their queries related to what was available, which made them uncomfortable. In spite of these statements, the study participants appeared reluctant to leave the working area that the home query window represented. The participants developed a familiarity with the titles and dates of the documents returned by the query, the documents had often been sorted by the participant by date, the windows had been resized and placed in a dedicated place on the screen, and some of the documents had been marked for various reasons.
Looking more closely at the process traces in Figure 2 , the black circles represent when the key documents were also high profit documents, or in other words, when the documents that were heavily relied upon were the best documents available in the database. Comparing the four participants that used high profit documents as their key documents vs. the four that did not, the difference between these two groups appears to be how persistent the participants were in searching for good documents (Table 1) . The participants that used high profit documents as their key documents did not have more years of experience, and they did not appear to use expert strategies to identify the high profit documents. They did, however, spend more time during the analysis, read more documents, and read more of the high profit documents. Based on these results, the participants did not appear able to identify the high profit documents in any other way than by "brute force" opening more documents. It is not surprising, given the baseline computer support that was provided, that all of the participants missed high profit documents without being aware of it. Samples that were returned by the keyword searches were essentially opaque in terms of how they related to what was available, such as what high profit documents were left out of the query results. Then documents were sampled based on a view of the dates and titles, which were also weak indicators of the utility of the document. For example, a July 25, 1996 report titled "Ariane 5 Failure: Inquiry Board Findings" was opened by several of the participants based on the title but was then judged to be disappointing because it was a short abstract (172 words) with little detailed information.
Sources of inaccurate statements
The database used in this study had many naturally occurring discrepancies in descriptions that the participants had to resolve. Participants were observed to effectively resolve many of these discrepancies. In some cases, however, the participants made inaccurate statements during their analyses or in their verbal briefings. By tracing why these inaccurate statements were made with the process tracing methodology, three sources of inaccurate statements were identified that give insight into the cognitive demands of inferential analysis under data overload: 1) using default assumptions that did not apply, 2) incorporating information that was inaccurate, and 3) relying on outdated information.
Regarding the first source, a couple of participants gave inaccurate statements that did not come from any of the reports that were opened. In these cases, the participants appeared to be drawing on their background knowledge to fill in gaps in their understanding. For example, one of the participants stated that the monetary loss of the Cluster satellite payload could be recovered by insurance. Although payloads are often insured, in this case they were not.
With regards to the second source, the database had many subtle inaccuracies in descriptions of the details of the cause of the rocket failure due to misunderstandings by report writers that the participants had to resolve. The participants described and employed a variety of labor-intensive strategies for tracking descriptions that corroborated and conflicted and from which documents in order to reduce their vulnerability to incorporating inaccurate information. Partly because this cognitively difficult process of corroborating information and resolving conflicting information was unsupported by the tools that they were provided, nearly every participant experienced some breakdowns in this process. Breakdowns included failing to corroborate information, missing conflicts in documents that were opened, forgetting how many corroborating and conflicting descriptions had been read from independent sources, forgetting the information sources, and treating descriptions that stemmed from the same source as corroborating.
For example, participant 7 recognized a conflict in the explanations for why the inertial guidance system shut down in documents 1440 and 858 (Figure 3 ). In the end, he based his analysis on the description in article 1440 because it was later and therefore more likely to have all the information, not translated and so less likely to have misunderstandings introduced by the translator, and from a more authoritative source (analysts had described in interviews that Aviation Week was judged to a more credible source than FBIS). Note, however, that even though his decision was correct, he did not notice/remember that a previous article that he had opened, 1385, corroborated the description that he selected, which would have made the judgment easier. This would have been particularly helpful in this case because, as he pointed out: "[The description in report 858] sounds good." This inaccurate description was written in a way that sounded as if the reporter had sufficient technical expertise to understand the cause in detail. If he had not come across the conflicting description which raised a flag and caused him to look at the inaccurate description in more detail, it is possible that he would have incorporated the inaccurate description in his briefing.
The third source of inaccurate statements was relying on "stale" information that had later been updated. For example, two participants stated that the Cluster satellite program was discontinued as a result of the 501 launch failure, which was true for about a month after the incident. Later, however, the program was fully reinstated, so from the perspective of several years later, the statement is inaccurate. As a result of basing an analysis on outdated information that had been overturned by later updates, study participants made several inaccurate statements at varying levels of importance. The updates were missed either because documents containing the updates were not opened or because his or her attention would be focused on other themes while reading the document containing the update.
The vulnerability to missing information updates is particularly troubling because it is difficult for practitioners to gauge whether or not there are any updates, let alone locate them. Updates often do not generate a flurry of reports and if they are about minor themes they are unlikely to be seen in document titles. It is possible, and indeed was observed to happen, that an analyst could employ the strategy of corroborating information from two independent, authoritative sources that were written in the same time period (which would eliminate the first two sources of inaccuracies), incorporate it into the analysis, and yet miss later updates that would render that information inaccurate. 
CONCLUSION
To summarize, the participants were vulnerable to missing critical information: missing high profit documents, missing information that is significant in its departure from standard situations, missing information that corroborates or conflicts with a particular description, and missing updates on a theme that could overturn previous information. Although in general analysts are aware of the possibilities of missing critical information, for specific instances, the calibration on how vulnerable an analysis is to missing information is a difficult task given that it is based on the absence of information.
From a broader perspective, some of the participants could be viewed as having prematurely closed the analysis process because of the difficulty in knowing when to stop in data overload situations. The potential impacts of premature closure are degraded quality and poorly calibrated confidence in the veracity of the analytic product and ability to respond to questions.
The strategy of this line of research is to understand why data overload is fundamentally hard. The main contribution from this study is a model of vulnerabilities in inferential analysis under data overload conditions. These vulnerabilities are informative because reducing these vulnerabilities directly translates to a set of challenging design criteria that humancentered solutions to data overload must meet in order to be useful (Woods et al., 1999) . These evaluation criteria are interesting, in part, because they are so difficult to address. They are not amenable to simple, straightforward adjustments or feature additions to current tools. Meeting these design criteria will require innovative design concepts. The next step in this line of research is to prototype design concepts that were generated from these study findings to use in artifactbased investigations targeted at further discovery of what would be useful support tools. "We know there was a problem because the guidance platforms shut down. After they shut down, the inertial reference system sent diagnostic information so they're designed to shut down when something goes wrong. Assuming the other system has taken over, it's sending diagnostic information so that the people on the ground can figure out what went wrong with it. Having them both shut down, the guidance computer is interpreting the diagnostic information as where it's at and instead of getting numbers, it's getting other things…" "...In this article, it says when it shut down, it started a reset procedure. In the other article, it says diagnostic information. This article and the other one…are incompatible, inconsistent with each other…Of course messages that can't both be right happen all the time. I'm finding it hard to believe that the vehicle is going to fly without any inertial inputs whatsoever …let's look at the source…FBIS report. Translated text…the other one was later also…it sounds good. If I had to guess, I would go with the other one.
